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Abstract
We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, soci-
ety comprises two groups who compete in every period for political power, i.e. the right to allocate
economic resources between the groups. Individuals can move from one group to another at a cost:
this cost of mobility is the index of inter-group differences. Since mobility is costly, the group in
power can keep a larger share for itself. The extent of such economic exclusion is limited by two
constraints: excessive exclusion reduces the opposition’s opportunity cost of engaging in political
conflict (conflict constraint) and, if a group keeps too much for itself, individuals switching from
the other group will dilute the per capita share of resources (mobility constraint). In determining the
optimal group size by attracting switchers, the incumbent faces a trade-off between low per capita
surplus and high political strength. We characterize the resource allocations, group membership de-
cisions and conflict decisions that arise in equilibrium. The two mechanisms of conflict and mobility
act as constraints to expropriation, and the optimal sharing is dictated by which constraint binds. The
extent of sharing turns out to be non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. We show that the limited
commitment with respect to switching can lead to inefficient conflict in equilibrium. We also derive
several testable predictions about when conflict will arise. Specifically, we show that conflict may
arise when the cost of mobility is moderate, but may not necessarily emerge when the cost is high.
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1 Introduction
Politics in divided societies often revolves around the line of social division. Group identities form the
basis of political coalitions, and the state identity belongs more to one group than another. Frequently, the
group in power engages in accumulating rent, and the opposition group members mobilize themselves in
conflict to alter the balance of political power. Much of the existing literature recognizes that the presence
of inter-group differences significantly affects the nature and frequency of political conflict.1 This claim
derives its support from evidence of conflict along various social cleavages, like race, ethnicity, religion,
caste, language, geography or ideology. Moreover, the relationship between conflict and the presence of
inter-group differences does not seem to be straightforward: For instance, there are examples where two
groups are in violent conflict in some society, while groups divided along exactly the same lines co-exist
peacefully in another (see for instance, Fearon and Laitin (1996), Posner (2004)). There are examples
of very dissimilar groups coexisting peacefully, while more similar groups engage in conflict. This leads
to the central question we ask in this paper: When and how do inter-group differences become salient in
political conflict?
We study divided societies in which political power involves gaining the decision rights over allo-
cation of society’s resources. When one group gains power, it can allocate more surplus to itself by
restricting the other group’s access. If resources are limited, the ruling group has a strong incentive to
engage in such economic exclusion. Examples of group based resource allocation are ubiquitous. Pol-
itics in India is a prime example where different religious, caste-based groups compete for group-based
reservations of limited resources, such as government jobs or access to higher education (See Chandra
(2004)). There are several examples of language being used as a basis of distributing economic resources
(See Laitin (2007)).2 The main thesis of this paper is that the extent of inter-group differences affects the
ruling group’s ability to practise group based resource allocation, and these factors, in turn, determine
the propensity of inter-group conflict.
How do inter-group differences affect the ruling group’s ability to practise economic exclusion? In
many contexts, group membership is an endogenous choice, and we measure that the extent of inter-group
differences by the cost to an individual of moving from one group to another.3 If a ruling group allocates
resources based on group identities, its decision affects which group people in society want to belong
to. For example, the allocation of jobs based on party allegiance may influence individuals’ choices of
switching membership between parties. Redistribution of resources based on geography can affect the
1See, for instance Caselli and Coleman (2006), Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999, 2011), Esteban et al. (2011), Gurr and Harff
(1994), Horowitz (1985, 2001), Fearon (1999, 2006).
2Other examples include group transfers based on ethnicity, profession, geographic location or even party allegiance.
3Cost of mobility may be endogenous. For instance, groups can build very strong identities that make it hard for outsiders
to penetrate, or impose a social cost on members who are likely to switch (Laitin (2007)). An example of the second type of
behavior is the “acting white” phenomenon among African American and Hispanic students. Fryer and Torelli (2010) describe
it as “a set of social interactions in which some minorities incur costs for investing in behavior characteristics of whites (e.g.,
raising their hand in class, making good grades, or having an interest in ballet).” Such peer-group effects go beyond the context
of the black-white division and can be found along many other cleavages, including ethnicity or class (Fryer (2007)). This in
effect increases the cost of mobility. In this paper, we focus on the cost of mobility in a given context, and so treat it as fixed.
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incentives for people to migrate.4 However, the ease or cost of mobility varies widely depending on
the basis of social cleavage. For instance, with racially dissimilar ethnic groups, switching identities
intrinsically hard.5 In contrast, changing one’s allegiance to a political party is much easier. The ruling
group can increase (decrease) its group size by retaining a disproportionately large (small) share of
resources. On the one hand, the ruling group wants to increase its size in order to increase its political
strength, and remain in power. But on the other hand, an increased group size implies a smaller per capita
share for the members. The trade-off between these two effects determines an optimal size that the ruling
group wants to have.6 The feasibility of reaching this optimal size necessarily depends on the cost of
mobility. This is how, in our framework, inter-group differences limits the extent of economic exclusion.
The extent of economic exclusion and inter-group mobility together affect the propensity of the
opposition to engage in conflict. If the ruling group leaves a very low share for the opposition, this
reduces the opposition’s opportunity cost of engaging in conflict. The opposition now is more inclined to
engage in conflict to try and change the balance of power. If the groups sizes are such that the opposition
has a high chance of overthrowing the incumbent in conflict, then the threat of conflict constrains the
extent of economic exclusion. While the extent of economic exclusion is endogenous in our model,
agents in society have two costly response mechanisms to improve their own payoffs: moving across
groups and waging conflict. The substitutability between these two mechanisms is akin to the “exit and
voice” mechanisms that have been studied in different socio-political contexts.
We develop a simple two-period model to analyze the resource allocation problem in a divided society
in which the ruling group can allocate resources based on group identities. Society is divided into two
groups who compete for political power. In each period, the ruling group gets elected either through a
default political process or as a result of conflict. The ruling group earns the right to decide how society’s
resources are divided between the two groups. At the start of each period, the ruling group proposes an
allocation of resources. The opposition can choose to either accept its share or collectively engage in
conflict.7 The opposition’s cost of conflict is an opportunity cost – it gives up the opportunity to enjoy its
share of surplus in the current period. For the incumbent, conflict implies a lower probability of retaining
power and a potential loss of economic resources. If the opposition decides to accept the share offered
by the ruling group and no conflict occurs, individuals (in both groups) can still choose whether they
4Other examples include sectoral redistribution of resources between the agricultural and industrial sector affecting the
opportunity costs of individuals and their decision to work in their respective sector.
5Mobility across ethnic groups can be by inter-racial/inter-ethnic marriages (Caselli and Coleman (2006)).
6Bates (1983) emphasized this trade off in his argument for the political salience of ethnicity – “Ethnic Groups are, in short,
a form of minimum willing coalition, large enough to secure benefits in the competition for spoils but also small enough to
maximize the per capita value of these benefits.”
7Conflict is modeled as collective action taken by the opposition to increase its own chance of gaining power compared to the
default political process. In reality, the nature of collective action can be varied – ranging from peaceful political mobilization
within the limits of accepted institutional norms to violent resistance. To draw examples from South Asia, the Dravidian
movement where the backward castes organized electorally against the Brahminical control of the Indian National Congress
by forming a party called DK (Dravidar Kazhagham) under Periyar E.V. Ramaswamy is a case of peaceful mobilization in a
democratic setup. At the other extreme, the Jaffna Tamils in Sri Lanka attempted to use the violent route under the leadership
of LTTE to protest against the dominant Sinhalese. Finally, caste politics in North India combines elements of both.
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want to stay in their respective group or switch at an individual cost. If an agent switches groups, she
gets a share of the new group’s resources. We characterize the resource allocations, group membership
decisions and conflict decisions that arise in equilibrium.
We find that sharing does occur in equilibrium. The two mechanisms of conflict and mobility act
as constraints to expropriation, and the optimal sharing is dictated by whether and which constraint
binds. In the unique equilibrium of this model, three different regimes can arise. The first type of
regime, which we call no conflict regime, is one in which the opposition does not engage in conflict, and
the ruling group allocates resources in a way to induce the optimal amount of switching. The second
possible regime is called open conflict regime, and here, the ruling group keeps everything for itself. The
opposition responds by engaging in conflict. Finally, there may be a peaceful belligerence regime, in
which the opposition does not engage in conflict and the incumbent shares just enough resources with
the opposition to prevent them from engaging in conflict.
Switching can occur in equilibrium in both the no conflict and peaceful belligerence regimes. The
conflict constraint plays a role in the open conflict and peaceful belligerence regimes. In the open conflict
regime, both the ruler and the opposition get a higher payoff from conflict, and therefore conflict emerges
in equilibrium. In the peaceful belligerence regime, on the other hand, the ruler strictly prefers to avoid
conflict, and so shares enough to make the opposition indifferent between conflict and no conflict. Our
results imply, in particular, that the extent of sharing is non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. The share
of resources that the incumbent retains is increasing, decreasing and constant with respect to the cost of
mobility in the no conflict, peaceful belligerence and open conflict regimes respectively.
In our framework, inefficient conflict arises in equilibrium. There are two sources of conflict. One
is limited commitment with respect to transfers: The ruling group cannot credibly commit today about
the resource allocation it will offer in the next period. This is in fact a well-known reason for conflict
to arise in standard models.8 However, one of the main contributions of this paper is to highlight a
second independent explanation for conflict: Limited commitment with respect to inter-group mobility.
In other words, agents cannot commit credibly to not switching group membership after they see the
proposed allocation. This constrains the set of allocations that can be implemented. In particular, certain
allocations that Pareto dominate the conflict outcome would require the incumbent group to retain its
original size, and this cannot be guaranteed in equilibrium due to the lack of commitment with respect
to switching. Thus, we show that endogeneous mobility across groups can increase the likelihood of
conflict in society. This finding has two key implications.
On the one hand, when the possibility of endogeneous mobility is low, the incumbent can possibly
implement an allocation rule that Pareto dominates the conflict outcome. Indeed, we find that open
conflict does not necessarily emerge when the cost of mobility is high. If conflict is too costly for the
incumbent, peaceful belligerence occurs in equilibrium. In other words, the ruling group prefers to share
8This mechanism is well studied in explaining democratic transition, coups (Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Acemoglu
and Robinson (2001b)) and civil wars (Fearon (1998)).
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resources with the opposition to avoid conflict. It turns out that peaceful belligerence is more likely to
occur when a majority rules. This result explains a documented feature of politics in divided societies,
that is not explained by existing theory. Empirical evidence suggests many examples of societies divided
along lines of ethnicity or race (where cost of mobility is naturally high), where there is no conflict
over resources, and indeed resource sharing occurs. To illustrate, one example is democratic politics in
India where there is a wide range of reservation policies for backward castes and religious minorities (by
which economic resources are shared), that have served to mitigate the threat of conflict. Padro´ i Miquel
(2007) also cites examples of some autocratic regimes (like Houphouet-Boigny in Ivory Coast), where
somewhat surprisingly, rulers even from majority ethnic groups transfer resources to the opposition.
On the other hand, as the possibility of endogenous mobility increases, the incumbent is constrained
in its ability to implement allocations that Pareto-dominate conflict. We find that open conflict can occur
at an intermediate cost of mobility. This is an interesting result, because while existing literature does
explain why conflict can arise in ethnically divided societies (high cost of mobility), there is no theory
about why we observe conflict in societies divided along other factors like language. In our framework,
a high cost of mobility implies that the premium from gaining power in the next period is high. This
means that the opposition’s incentive to engage in conflict is high when cost of mobility is high, and the
ruling group’s incentive to induce conflict is high when cost of mobility is low. Therefore open conflict
occurs when the cost of mobility is in an intermediate range. We also show that, a small group would be
more prone to instigate conflict as its short-term per capita gain from full appropriation is high.
When the cost of mobility is sufficiently low, the opposition’s opportunity cost of conflict becomes
high as its members can switch their group identity at low cost. The model predicts that no conflict
occurs when groups have low cost of mobility and when the ruling group is more likely to retain power
in conflict. In such situations, the mobility constraint dictates the optimal sharing rule. The group in
power aims to maintain an optimal size, large enough to increase the probability of staying in power,
but small enough to still have a high per capita share of resources. This optimal group size is endoge-
nously determined, and if the initial size of the ruling group is below the optimal group size, we observe
switching in equilibrium. Examples of switching towards the powerful group is not uncommon in his-
tory. Post-Reform Europe witnessed a series of religious switching (back and forth between Catholicism
and Protestantism), depending on which division had the stronger political alliance. Caselli and Coleman
(2006) obtain a result that is similar in spirit.
Our framework allows us to ask how much mobility across groups an incumbent would ideally per-
mit, if this were an endogenous choice. For instance, people in society may differ in ethnicity and
language, and the ruling group may be able to choose the dimension along which resources will be split.
Since the cost of mobility effectively increases a group’s premium from being in power, we should expect
ruling groups to always prefer a maximal cost of mobility. However, we find that incumbent may prefer
a social division with intermediate cost of mobility - this happens when conflict sufficiently reduces the
chances of the incumbent retaining power.
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1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the large literature on conflict in divided societies. Existing literature argues
that inter-group differences can matter in political coalition formation, and thereby in political con-
flict. Fearon (2006) argues that inter-group heterogeneity and intra-group homogeneity help political
entrepreneurs mobilize people based on group identities. Bates (1983) suggests that group identities
matter for forming coalitions in distributional conflict over political goods. While this line of argument
highlights the role of inter-group differences, it does not explain why certain group divisions matter more
compared to others. Closer to our analysis are Fearon (1999) and Caselli and Coleman (2006), who con-
sider the possibility of inter-group mobility. Fearon suggests that distributive politics favors coalitions
based on unchangeable characteristics “because it makes excluding losers from the winning coalition rel-
atively easy.” Caselli and Coleman (2006) are the first to develop a formal model that allows inter-group
mobility in this context, and find that conflict is less likely to occur in situations where switching identity
is easy since it is anticipated that winning coalition would expand. Our paper differs in two substantive
ways. First, the extent of economic exclusion is endogenous in our model. In Caselli and Coleman,
when a group seizes power, it gets to consume all the resources. In contrast, we allow the ruling group
to decide how to allocate resources. Thus our analysis helps us to understand how economic exclusion
is linked to the risk of conflict and to the optimal group size. Second, Caselli and Coleman assume that
groups compete over an exogenously given pool of expropriable resources, and derive comparative stat-
ics on how conflict varies with the amount of resources. In contrast, in our analysis, the cost of mobility
affects the premium from gaining power, and in a sense constitutes the prize that groups are fighting for.
Specifically, in a situation with high cost of mobility, while the opposition has a strong incentive to en-
gage in conflict to seize power, the incumbent wants to share resources to mitigate conflict. This tension
can result in a peaceful belligerence equilibrium – an aspect consistent with empirical observation, but
not captured in previous work.
This paper is also connected to the literature on the relationship between conflict and measures of
fragmentation in societies. One class of such measures depends on the distribution of group size alone.
For example, Hirschman-Herfindahl fractionalization index (Hirschman (1964)) is widely used in empir-
ical studies on conflict.9 Subsequent work introduced polarization indices that incorporate inter-group
heterogeneity through a notion of inter-group distance (Esteban and Ray (1994)).10 Recent work by
(Esteban and Ray (2011)) argues that fractionalization measures that do not depend on variations in
inter-group differences, can not really capture the extent of division in societies, and find that the polar-
ization measure is significant in predicting social conflict. We view our work as complementary to this
literature. Our model suggests that measures of division in societies, as a predictor of conflict, must in-
corporate information on both group size distribution as well as inter-group differences. In addition, we
9Though widely used, the empirical connection is not always strong (Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003),
Miguel et al. (2004).
10Alternative measures of polarization are proposed by Foster and Wolfson (1992), Wolfson (1994), Reynal-Querol (2002),
Rodrı´guez and Salas (2002) and Esteban and Ray (2007).
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provide an explanation of why the contested prize may be increasing in inter-group differences. Specifi-
cally, if the winning group can exclude other groups from accessing economic resources based on group
identities, the cost of inter-group mobility can provide us a measure of the rent that winning group can
extract.
We also contribute to the literature on models of conflict and rent seeking (see Grossman (1991),
Hirshleifer (1995), Azam (1995), Azam (2001), Esteban and Ray (1999), Esteban and Ray (2008) and
others).11 However, our paper is substantively different in that we are interested in relating inter-group
mobility with conflict. In a similar framework, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) develop a model in
which two groups share resources and engage in two different kinds of economic activity. They find that
the incumbent, even when engaged in a relatively inefficient mode of production, keeps more resources
to itself to increase its political strength by attracting new entrants because of limited commitment.
In our framework, we consider a symmetric production functions across groups. If we had considered
asymmetric production function, inefficient redistribution would have taken place in our model whenever
incumbent is engaged in less efficient productive activities.
Finally, our work is also related to a vast empirical literature on inter-group conflict. Collier (2001)
and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) provide useful surveys of this literature. In our framework, conflict
and economic rent seeking are simultaneously determined, and the equilibrium amount of rent seeking
varies non-monotonically with respect to inter-group differences. These results have testable implications
and a systematic empirical analysis would be very interesting.12
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model. In Section 3, we
characterize the resource allocations and the regimes that arise in equilibrium. In Section 4, we discuss
the key implications of our model and the empirical predictions. Section 5 concludes. Most proofs are
in the Appendix.
2 Model
Consider the following two-period game. There is a continuum of agents of measure 1. Members of
society are divided into two groups A and B. In each period, a fixed amount of resources (normalized to
1) must be divided between the two groups.13 Agents can participate in some economic activity, and the
resources are productive inputs that agents can use to enhance their payoffs from economic activity.
Each period (t = 1, 2) starts with a ruling group Wt. (We use the terms, ruling group, winning group
and incumbent interchangeably). At the start of period 1, suppose the size of the winning group is pi0.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the group with political power in period 1 is group A. The
winning group proposes a sharing rule αt, where αt is the fraction of resources to be retained by the
11Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) provide a comprehensive survey of this literature.
12Alesina et al. (1999) provide some evidence of positive relationship between ethnic fragmentation and ethnically based
patronage. Guiso et al. (2009) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) look at economic consequences of genetic distance. Though
genetic distance is not necessarily a measure of inter-group mobility cost, it can reflect inter-group differences to an extent.
13Our results are unchanged as long as the size of resources in each period is independent of the group sizes.
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ruling group. Once the ruling group announces the split αt, the losing group (opposition) Lt can choose
to either accept its share or reject it.
If the sharing rule is accepted, each individual (in Wt and Lt) decides whether to remain in his
own group or switch to the other group. Individuals can change groups at a cost φ ∈ [0, 1]. The
parameter φ measures how difficult it is to assimilate into a different group. The exact nature of the cost
depends on the specific context. For example, φ may represent the cost associated with entry barriers
like language-based discrimination. In other contexts, φ may measure the extent to which groups are
able to discriminate: for instance, it is easy to discriminate based on skin color or racial identity, making
such groups hard to infiltrate (high φ).14 Here, while switching groups is costly, the cost is bounded. In
particular, φ ≤ 1 implies that if the ruling group keeps all resources for itself, the members of the other
group would find it profitable to switch over. Since we are interested in isolating the effect of inter-group
differences, agents are assumed to be homogeneous except for their initial group membership.
Clearly, if individuals switch group membership, this changes the size of the groups. Let pit and
1 − pit denote the sizes of the groups at the end of period t. If a group of size pit gets fraction αt of
society’s resources, the per capita payoff that its members get from economic activity is given by αt
pit
(the
assumption of linear payoff from resources is made here for simplicity).15 At the end of the period, one
group is chosen as the ruler for the next period through a default political process. We abstract from
the institutional details of the political contest, and simply assume that the ruler Wt remains in power
with the probability pd(pit). We assume that the political contest success function pd(·) is increasing in
group size pi ∈ [0, 1], and is continuous and twice differentiable. For tractability, we also assume that
pd(pi)(1 − pi) is single-peaked, and the maximum is attained at p˜i ∈ (0, 1).16
If the sharing rule is rejected, the ruling group retains all the resources, and the opposition engages in
conflict. In terms of current period payoffs, conflict is socially wasteful: A fraction (1 − k) of the entire
surplus gets destroyed. The opposition group gets zero economic payoff in the current period, and the
incumbent group enjoys the remaining surplus. Conflict in our model can be interpreted as any kind of
political activism undertaken by the opposition group, that is costly to them in the short-run, but increases
the probability of their becoming the ruler in the next period, such as violent protests, demonstrations, or
mobilization of voters.
In case of conflict, individuals do not have the opportunity to switch groups, and so the size of the
groups remains unchanged (pit = pit−1). At the end of the period, one group is chosen as the ruler for the
next period. We assume that the ruling group stays in power with probability pc(pit). Conflict implies
that the ruling group has a lower chance of getting elected relative to the default political process, i.e.,
14As mentioned before, in reality φ may be endogenous: A group can decide to discriminate members who have infiltrated
from a different group and effectively increase the cost of mobility. In this paper, we take φ as exogenous.
15We assume that a group’s resources are evenly divided among its members. In many contexts, it may be more reasonable
to assume that resources are shared unequally, based on some hierarchy within the group. We do not address this issue here.
16Our assumptions on pd(·) allows for many common political contest functions like S-shaped contest success functions and
proportional representation functions. “First-past-the-post” functions are a limit case of the class of functions considered here.
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Figure 1: Timing: Sequence of play in any period t
pc(·) ≤ pd(·). Engaging in conflict is a group decision taken by the opposition.17 Figure 1 gives a
pictorial representation of the game.
The solution concept is sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Note that there are two kinds of decisions
being made. The winning group makes a collective decision on the allocation rule and the opposition
makes a collective decision on whether or not to accept the proposed allocation. When groups make
collective decisions, they seek to maximize the expected long-run payoff of their members.18 Since we
consider a finite number of periods, we assume that the long-run payoff is simply the sum of per-period
payoffs. On the other hand, group members take individual switching decisions (in case of acceptance),
which are based on maximizing their short-term payoffs.19 We make the tie-breaking assumption that
when the opposition is indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer, it accepts.
17We ignore the collective action problem here. Think of a leader being able to coordinate the decision to wage conflict.
18In order to focus on the key issue, we ignore any collective action problems despite assuming a continuum of agents. In
our context, this is a reasonable assumption since individuals in a group are identical, and so decisions can be unanimous.
19We interpret periods as generations, and hence treat individual members as myopic and the groups as long-lived. The
qualitative results are unchanged if we considered non-myopic agents. Please refer to Section 4.1 for a more detailed discussion.
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3 Analysis
We solve the two stage game by backward induction.
3.1 Equilibrium play in period 2
Consider play in period 2, after a ruling group has been chosen. Any subgame is now described by the
identity and size of the group in power. Let W2 ∈ {A,B} denote the ruling group and let piW1 denote the
size of the ruling group. To characterize equilibrium play, we proceed in three steps. We first characterize
the switching rule in period 2 (and resulting group sizes) as a function of the announced allocation. Next,
we show that conflict never arises in period 2. Finally, we characterize the optimal equilibrium allocation
for the ruling group, and show that it induces no switching by either group in the second period.
First, consider the node where an allocation αW2 proposed by the ruling group W2 has been accepted
by the opposition L2. We want to characterize the group compositions on and off equilibrium path. It is
easy to see that it is impossible to have a situation where members of both groups want to switch to the
other group. Further, two conditions must be true: First, in equilibrium, members of neither group can
have a strict incentive to switch to the other group, and second, if the group compositions are such that
members of one group have a strict incentive to switch to the other group, the size of that group continues
to decrease until the incentive to switch no longer exists.20 Notice that since the share of surplus remains
unchanged, as individuals switch from say group A to group B, the per capita payoff of the members of
group A increases and that of members of group B decreases. The two conditions above together imply
that if there is switching (say, from A to B), the size of group A reduces to the point where the members
are indifferent between switching and not switching.
The following lemma characterizes the group compositions that obtain in equilibrium at the end of
period 2 (as a result of potential switching), for any given allocation αW2 .
Lemma 1 (Group Switching Decisions in Period 2). Suppose the ruling group W2 is of size piW1 at
the start of period 2, and offers an allocation αW2 . Define functions f(pi) ≡ pi + φpi(1 − pi) and
g(pi) ≡ pi−φpi(1−pi). The following describes the resulting group size piW2 at the end of period 2, given
that the offer of an allocation αW2 is accepted.
If αW2 < g(piW1 ), then piW2 = g−1(αW2 )
If αW2 ∈ [g(piW1 ), f(piW1 )], then piW2 = piW1
If αW2 > f(piW1 ), then piW2 = f−1(αW2 )
Proof. It is straightforward to check that the functions f(·) and g(·) are strictly increasing on [0, 1], and
20This description of equilibrium group sizes is similar to the long run entry and exit conditions for firms in a perfectly
competitive market.
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so, their inverses are well-defined. Consider an allocation αW2 > f(piW1 ). In this range, we have
αW2 > f(pi
W
1 )⇔
αW2
piW1
− φ > 1− α
W
2
1− piW1
.
In other words, for given incumbent group size piW1 , the per capita payoff of members of W2 exceeds
that of members of L2 by more than φ. Group W2 retains such a large share of the resources that it will
attract switchers from the opposition. The size of group W2 would now increase to ensure that
αW2
piW2
− φ = 1− α
W
2
1− piW2
⇔ αW2 = f(piW2 ) (1)
In the inequality above, the left hand side is the second period payoff of agents who switch from L2 to
W2 and the right hand side is the same for those who stay back in L2. Switching would occur so that the
group size adjusts to ensure that the two are the same. In the same way, if the ruling group leaves too
little for itself (αW2 < g(piW1 )), there is an incentive for its own members to switch to the opposition:
αW2 < g(pi
W
1 )⇔
αW2
piW1
<
1− αW2
1− piW1
− φ
and the size of group W2 decreases to ensure indifference between those who switch and those who do
not. In this case, we have αW2 = g(piW2 ). Finally, there is an intermediate range, αW2 ∈ [g(piW1 ), f(piW1 )]
where members of neither group has an incentive to switch. αW2 ≤ f(piW1 ) ⇔ α
W
2
piW
1
− φ ≤ 1−αW2
1−piW
1
and
αW2 ≥ g(piW1 )⇔ α
W
2
piW
1
≥ 1−αW2
1−piW
1
− φ. In this case, no switching would occur and piW2 = piW1 .
Lemma 1 determines the resulting group sizes (and payoff) of members of group L2 in the event that
an allocation αW2 is accepted. We now ask what range of offers by the incumbent would be accepted by
group L2. Since there is no gain from conflict in the second (terminal) period, any offer αW2 > 0 would
be accepted by group L2.
We can now characterize the optimal offer α∗2 made by group W2 in period 2. Given an initial
group size piW1 , the ruling group W2 chooses α∗2 to maximize the per capita payoff
αW
2
piW
2
(αW
2
)
of its current
members. Recall that if αW2 is above a threshold, there will be switchers from group L2 and piW2 (αW2 )
will increase. Similarly, if αW2 is below a threshold, players will induce switch away from W2. So, it is
unclear a priori how the per capita payoffs change with αW2 . The following lemma establishes that the
per capita payoff of the ruling group attains a maximum at the point where switching is just prevented.
Lemma 2. Suppose the size of group W2 at the beginning of period 2 is piW1 . The per capita payoff of
members of group W2 is maximized at α∗2 = f(piW1 ) ≡ piW1 + φpiW1 (1− piW1 ).
The proof of the lemma is in the appendix. To see the intuition, notice that for switching to occur,
the group which attracts new members must offer a higher per capita payoff. In particular, the group
attracting members should have a payoff higher than 1 while the other group must have a payoff lower
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than 1.21 Therefore, any allocation where the incumbent induces its own members to switch to the
opposition is strictly dominated by the allocation αW = piW . On the other hand, the incumbent may
attract members by increasing its own allocation, but in this case, switching ensures that the group size
of the incumbent increases at a rate faster than the increase in its share of surplus. This decreases the
per capita share. Since there is no political benefit from an increased group size in the terminal period,
inducing switching is not attractive in the terminal period. The discussion above directly yields the
following proposition that fully characterizes equilibrium play in the second period.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Behavior in Period 2). Suppose the ruling group is of size piW1 at the start
of period 2.
i) The ruling group allocates a fraction α∗2 = piW1 + φpiW1 (1 − piW1 ) to itself and the remainder
(1− α∗2) to the opposition.
ii) The opposition does not engage in conflict.
iii) No switching occurs across groups. In particular, members of the ruling group strictly prefer
to remain in the group and members of the opposition are indifferent between switching and not
switching.
iv) The per capita payoff of the ruling group in period 2 is given by 1 + φ(1 − piW1 ) and that of the
opposition is 1− φpiW1 .
The crux of the result is that even though there is no threat of conflict in the last period, the incum-
bent still leaves some surplus for the opposition. The amount of sharing is driven by the “switching
constraint.” The ruling group shares just enough resources to make the opposition indifferent between
switching and not. Endogenous inter-group mobility acts as a disciplining device for the incumbent and
prevents total expropriation of resources. In equilibrium there is no switching.22 This result is related
to the second period being the last. A ruling group would induce switching only if it helps it to gain
political strength. However, in the last period, there is no incentive to increase political strength.
Proposition 1 says that for a group of size pi1 at the end of period 1, the per capita payoff in period 2
is 1+φ(1−pi1) if it wins political power in period 2, and 1−φ(1−pi1) if the other group wins political
power. Notice that if mobility across groups were costless, then all members of society would enjoy
an equal payoff of 1 regardless of which group was in power. With positive cost of mobility, there is
a premium from being in power. In particular, for a group with size pi1 the per capita payoff premium
from winning political power is 2φ(1−pi1), which is increasing in the cost of mobility and decreasing in
group size. This has two important implications. First, as the cost of mobility increases, the opposition
in period 1 has a higher propensity to reject the incumbent’s offer and launch conflict, and the incumbent
21Since piW
“
α
W
piW
”
+ (1− piW )
“
1−αW
1−piW
”
= 1.
22If we were to introduce some heterogeneity in switching costs, switching would occur in equilibrium. We make the
assumption of uniform costs of mobility just for simplicity.
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on the other hand has a stronger incentive to avoid conflict. Thus, for high cost of mobility, the society
will be more conflict-prone: either there will be actual conflict in equilibrium, or the allocation of surplus
will be driven by the necessity to prevent conflict. Second, while an increase in group size increases the
probability of winning power in the next period, it also reduces the value of political power by diluting
the per capita premium earned. The decision to attract switchers in period 1 then involves a tradeoff
between an increased probability of winning and loss in per capita payoffs.
3.2 Equilibrium play in the first period
Next, we characterize equilibrium behavior in period 1. Without loss of generality, suppose group A is
the winning group at the start of the game, i.e., W1 = A. Recall that the initial size of group A is piA0 .
Let piA1 denote the size of group A realized at the end of period 1 after switching decisions are taken.
Group A must choose an optimal allocation of resources αA1 . Once the allocation is announced, the
opposition can either accept it or reject it. If the allocation is accepted, we say that play proceeds along the
“economic path,” or the path of economic activity (in which switching can take place). If the allocation is
rejected, we say that play proceeds along the “conflict path”. Let EA(αA1 , piA1 ) and EB(αA1 , piA1 ) denote
the per capita payoffs to members in group A and B respectively, when play proceeds along the economic
path, given allocation αA1 and induced new group size piA1 . Similarly, let PA and PB denote the per capita
payoffs, when play proceeds along the path of conflict, given αA1 and piA0 . It is easy to derive expressions
for the payoffs along the economic and conflict paths respectively.
EA(α
A
1 , pi
A
1 ) =
αA
1
piA
1
+ pd(pi
A
1 )[1 + φ(1− piA1 )] + [1− pd(piA1 )][1 − φ(1− piA1 )]
=
αA
1
piA
1
+ 1 + φ(1− piA1 )[2pd(piA1 )− 1]
EB(α
A
1 , pi
A
1 ) =
1−αA
1
1−piA
1
+ pd(pi
A
1 )[1− φpiA1 ] + [1− pd(piA1 )][1 + φpiA1 ]
=
1−αA
1
1−piA
1
+ 1 + φpiA1 [1− 2pd(piA1 )]
PA =
k
piA
0
+ 1 + φ(1 − piA0 )(2pc(piA0 )− 1)
PB = 1 + φpi
A
0 (1− 2pc(piA0 )).
3.2.1 Play along economic path in period 1
Consider the node in period 1, where the ruling group A offers an allocation αA1 that is accepted by B.
By offering different allocations, the ruling group can induce switching activity and change the group
size. The following lemma characterizes the new group size piA1 as a function of the offered allocation
αA1 , for any given incumbent size piA0 .
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Lemma 3. [Group Switching Decisions in Period 1] Suppose A is the incumbent group in period 1 with
initial size piA0 . If the announced allocation αA1 is accepted, then the new size of group A is given by
piA1 (α
A
1 ) =

piA0 if αA1 ∈ [g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )]
f−1(αA1 ) if αA2 > f(piA0 )
g−1(αA1 ) if αA2 < g(piA0 ),
where f and g are defined as before: f(pi) ≡ pi + φpi(1− pi) and g(pi) ≡ pi − φpi(1 − pi).
Since switching decisions are based only on current period payoffs, Lemma 3 is a replica of Lemma
1, and hence we omit the proof. The lemma shows that if the incumbent retains a very high (very low)
share of resources, this induces switching from the opposition (incumbent) group to the other group. If
the allocation is close to the proportional allocation, then no switching occurs. Along the economic path,
the incumbent will choose an allocation that induces its most preferred group size.
The next lemma characterizes this optimal group size pi1 and the corresponding allocation (denoted
by αe). It turns out that the incumbent’s payoff on the economic path is maximized at an intermediate
group size. To see why, recall that increasing group size has two opposing effects: It increases the
incumbent’s probability of retaining power on the economic path, and it reduces the per capita payoff.
For low pi1, the first effect dominates, and so, economic payoff is increasing in pi1. For values of pi1
close to 1, the opposite effect dominates. Since we assume pd(pi)(1 − pi) is single-peaked, the unique
maximum payoff is attained at piA1 = p˜i. In particular, Lemma 4 shows that if piA0 < p˜i then the incumbent
shares more to induce some switching so that the new group size piA1 = p˜i. If the initial group size piA0
is already larger than p˜i, then the maximal payoff on the economic path is reached when the opposition
members are indifferent between switching and not switching, i.e. at αA1 = f(piA0 ). The lemma also
shows that the payoff on the economic path for group B is single-peaked in the share of surplus.
Lemma 4 (Maximal Payoff on Economic Path). Suppose A is the incumbent group in period 1, and
its offered allocation αA1 is accepted by B. Then the payoffs along the economic path to each group
EA(α
A
1 , pi1(α
A
1 )) and EB(αA1 , pi1(αA1 )) are single peaked in αA1 . The payoff for group A is maximized
at αA1 = α
e
, given by
αe = f(piA), where piA = max{piA0 , p˜i}
The proof of the lemma is in the appendix. It builds on an intuition similar to Lemma 2.
3.2.2 Opposition’s preference for conflict in period 1
We have characterized group compositions induced by each allocation conditional on acceptance and
the corresponding payoffs for each group on the economic path. Next, we analyze each group’s prefer-
ences over going down the path of conflict, in order to determine which path of play will be chosen in
equilibrium . Consider first the preferences of the opposition.
13
Lemma 5 (Opposition’s Conflict Threshold). For any piA0 , there is a threshold α¯ ∈ [0, 1] such that the
opposition (group B) accepts an allocation αA1 proposed by the incumbent (group A) if and only if the
allocation αA1 satisfies αA1 ≤ α¯. The threshold α¯ is decreasing in the cost of mobility, and there exists a
threshold φ1 > 0 given by
φ1 =
1
piA0
(
1 + 2pd(1)
1
piA
0
− 2pc(piA0 )
)
such that α¯ = 1 if φ ≤ φ1. Thus, all allocations are accepted if the cost of mobility is below φ1.
The interested reader may refer to the appendix for the proof. The logic of the proof is as follows:
We know from Lemma 4, that group B’s payoff on the economic path first increases and then decreases
with αA1 . On the other hand, its payoff on the conflict path is constant. It is easy to check that, when
αA1 = 0, then its payoff on the economic path is higher than that from conflict. This implies that two
cases can arise: (i) B’s payoff along the economic path is higher than that on the conflict path for all
allocations αA1 , or (ii) B’s payoff along the economic path is higher for low enough αA1 (high enough
share for B). Since the payoff from conflict is increasing in the cost of mobility, the former case obtains
when the cost of mobility is low enough.
The two thresholds φ1 and α¯ completely describe the opposition’s preferences over conflict. The
decision to reject the incumbent’s offer and launch conflict may be thought of as an investment. By
rejecting an offer, the opposition gives up its payoff in the current period, but raises the probability of
winning power next period. If the cost of intergroup mobility is below the threshold φ1, then even if
the incumbent group offers nothing to the opposition, the opposition finds it more profitable to simply
switch sides and share the incumbent’s surplus rather than launch conflict. On the other hand, if the cost
is above φ1, the premium from winning power is large enough so that the current period benefit must be
high enough for the allocation to be accepted.
3.2.3 Incumbent’s preference for conflict in period 1
Lemma 5 tells us that E := [0, α¯] is the set of allocations that induce the opposition to follow the
economic path, and the complement (which we denote by P ) is the set of allocations that induce the
opposition to engage in conflict. To understand which path of play the incumbent would prefer, we need
to compare the incumbent’s payoff along the path of conflict with its maximum possible payoff along
the economic path, i.e. we compare PA with maxαA
1
∈E EA(α
A
1 ). We show in the following lemma that
there is a threshold such that the incumbent’s maximal payoff on the economic path is higher than that
on the conflict path if and only if the cost of mobility is above the threshold.
Notice that, if φ ≤ φ1, then P is an empty set. In this case, the incumbent is restricted to the
economic path, and must choose αe even if conflict provides a higher payoff than the maximal payoff
on the economic path. Note also, that if P is non-empty, all choices of αA1 ∈ P lead to the same payoff
along the path of conflict. We assume in this case that the incumbent chooses αP1 = 1. This assumption
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is consistent with the interpretation that if an offer is rejected, all the surplus remains with the incumbent,
and further note that if P is non-empty, αP1 = 1 always lies in P .23
Lemma 6 (Incumbent’s Conflict Threshold). There exists a threshold φ2 given by
φ2 =
(
k − piA0
1− piA0
) 1
piA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A)1−pi
A
1−piA
0
− 2pc(piA0 )
)

such that EA(αe, piA1 (αe, piA0 )) ≥ PA if and only if the cost of mobility φ is weakly greater than the
threshold φ2.
The proof of the above lemma is in the appendix. The intuition is straightforward. By inducing the
path of conflict, the incumbent can enjoy the entire surplus in the current period, but there is a reduction
in the probability of retaining power in the next period. Therefore, inducing conflict is worthwhile only if
the premium from winning power in the next period is low, i.e., the cost of mobility is below a threshold.
Note that φ2 can lie outside [0, 1]. Since the attractiveness of the conflict path is increasing in k, the
threshold φ2 is strictly increasing in k. If k > piA0 , it is possible that φ2 > 1, i.e., for any cost of mobility,
the incumbent prefers the conflict path over its maximum payoff on the economic path. This happens
when conflict does not sufficiently reduce the incumbent’s probability of retaining power; for example,
if k = 1, p¯i = piA0 and pd(piA0 ) − pc(piA0 ) < 1−pi
A
0
2piA
0
. On the other hand, if conflict is very destructive, (if
k < piA0 ), then φ2 < 0. In this case, the incumbent does not want conflict, if the opposition will accept
allocation αe. Next, we characterize the conditions under which αe is indeed accepted by the opposition.
We show in the lemma below, that there is a threshold φ3, above which αe is not feasible along the
economic path. If φ is very high (φ > φ3), then there is a high premium from power in the second
period. This increases the propensity of the opposition to engage in conflict. In this case, a split of
αe leaves too little for the opposition to accept, and is therefore not feasible on the economic path. To
induce the opposition to follow the economic path, the incumbent needs to offer a higher share to the
opposition. The “best” allocation for the incumbent that still induces economic activity is then α where
the opposition is given just enough to make it indifferent between the economic path and conflict.
Lemma 7 (Feasibility of αe on economic path). There exists a threshold φ3 > 0 given by
φ3 =
1
piA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A)pi
A
piA
0
− 2pc(piA0 )
)
23We could have an alternative specification of the model, where the incumbent’s payoff under conflict is kα
A
1
piA
1
rather than
simply k
piA
1
. Here, the interpretation is that after the incumbent decides the allocation, the opposition chooses to either consume
its share of resources in productive economic activity or to invest it to mobilize conflict. In this case, αP1 = 1 is the strictly
optimal allocation for the incumbent. To see why, note that the incumbent’s payoff PA(αA1 ) is linearly increasing in αA1 , and it
chooses αA1 to maximize {maxαA
1
∈P PA(α
A
1 ),maxαA
1
∈E EA(α
A
1 )}. It is easy to see that if P is non-empty, αP1 = 1 ∈ P .
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such that αe induces economic activity, i.e. αe ∈ E if and only if the cost of mobility φ is weakly less than
the threshold φ3. Whenever φ > φ3, the incumbent’s payoff from economic activity EA(α, piA1 (α, piA0 ))
is increasing in α in the set of allocations E = [0, α] that induce economic activity.
The interested reader may refer to the appendix for the proof of the lemma. This lemma implies
that if αe will not induce the opposition to follow the economic path, then the incumbent must choose
between inducing conflict and offering allocation α¯ and inducing the economic path: It must compare
EA(α, pi
A
1 (α, pi
A
0 )) and PA. Recall, that as the cost of mobility increases, there are two opposing effects:
On the one hand, there is a large premium from gaining power in the next period and so the incumbent
would prefer to induce economic activity. On the other hand, as φ increases, the incumbent has to offer
more to the opposition in the current period to induce economic activity. The incumbent’s choice is
driven by this tradeoff across periods. It turns out that for large enough φ, the first effect dominates
the second. In other words, there is a threshold cost of mobility φ4 above which the incumbent prefers
EA(α, pi
A
1 (α, pi
A
0 )) to PA. The following lemma states this formally.
Lemma 8 (Sharing to prevent conflict). There exists a threshold φ4 ≥ max{φ2, φ3} given by
φ4 =
1
piA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A
0 )− 2pc(piA0 )
)
such that the incumbent prefers to offer α rather than αP whenever φ ≥ φ4.
The proof of the lemma is in the appendix.
3.2.4 Incumbent’s optimal allocation choice in period 1
Now, we can fully characterize the resource allocations that arise in equilibrium. There are two factors
that determine how the incumbent decides to allocate resources. First, if the incumbent keeps too much
surplus for itself, it may attract switchers from the opposition which would increase its political strength,
but reduce the per capita share for the original members of the group: thus the incumbent will decide
its allocation so as to achieve its optimal group size. Second, the ruling group might also want to share
resources with the opposition so that the economic path is sufficiently attractive for the opposition, and
they do not engage in conflict. These two constraints on expropriation - the switching constraint and the
conflict constraint - together determine how resources are shared on the economic path. In the unique
equilibrium, three different regimes arise depending on parameter values.
• No Conflict regime: In this regime, play proceeds on the economic path, and the switching con-
straint determines the allocation. The optimal allocation choice is α∗1 = αe. If piA0 < p˜i, the
incumbent induces opposition members to switch and achieve the target group size p˜i. If piA0 > p˜i,
then there is no switching, and the incumbent shares enough to keep the opposition indifferent
between switching and not switching.
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• Peaceful Belligerence regime: In this regime also, play proceeds along the economic path, but the
extent of sharing is driven by the imperative to prevent the opposition from engaging in conflict.
Here, α∗1 = α. The incumbent shares just enough resources to make the opposition indifferent
between the economic path and conflict. If piA0 < piA1 (α) ≤ p˜i, then there is some switching, and
otherwise, there is no switching.
• Open Conflict regime: In this regime, play proceeds along the conflict path. The incumbent
implements conflict through full exploitation of resources, i.e., α∗1 = αP = 1. Neither the conflict
constraint nor the switching constraint binds, and the incumbent prefers to allow conflict.
The next proposition is the main result of the paper and characterizes equilibrium play in the first period.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Allocation Choice in Period 1). Suppose A is the incumbent group in
period 1 with size piA0 . The equilibrium choice of allocation α∗1 in period 1 is as follows.
• If φ ≤ φ1, then the no-conflict regime prevails.
• If φ ∈ (φ1, φ2], then the open conflict regime occurs.
• If φ ∈ (max {φ1, φ2} , φ3], then the no conflict regime prevails.
• If φ ∈ (max {φ2, φ3} , φ4) then peaceful belligerence regime occurs if k is lower than a certain
threshold and open conflict prevails otherwise.
• If φ ≥ φ4, then peaceful belligerence prevails.
The proof of this proposition is in the Appendix. The intuition is as follows. When the cost of
mobility is low, the incumbent wants to induce conflict by retaining the entire surplus in the current
period. However, its ability to induce conflict is limited by the opposition’s preference for conflict. When
the cost of mobility is sufficiently low, even if the incumbent retains a very high share, the opposition
finds it more profitable to switch groups. However, at an intermediate range of φ, the opposition does
respond by engaging in conflict. When the cost of mobility is high, the premium from gaining power in
the second period is high. So, the incumbent wants to avoid conflict to retain power, while the opposition
wants to engage in conflict. Ideally, the incumbent wants to induce economic activity by retaining αe.
But, when the cost of mobility is sufficiently high, the incumbent needs to offer more to the opposition
to prevent conflict. To illustrate the equilibrium, we present a specific example below.
Example 1. Suppose the contest success functions are pd (pi) = pi (pi + d (1− pi)), and pc (pi) =
pi (pi + c (1− pi)). Both functions increase in pi, and satisfy our concavity condition for all d ≥ 0.
Also, d ≥ c ⇒ pd (pi) ≥ pc (pi). If d = 1, pd (pi) = pi, i.e., the success probability is measured by the
group-size. If d > 1, the ruling group enjoys an incumbency advantage in addition to the size effect,
along the economic path. Figure 2 plots the success probabilities and the equilibrium regimes for any φ
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Figure 2: Incumbent’s success probabilities (left) and equilibrium regimes (right)
and pi0 (for d = 2, c = 0.5 and k = 0.9). Notice that open conflict does not necessarily occur at a high
cost of mobility. Further, peaceful belligerence occurs for high values of pi0 and φ. The dotted line shows
the optimal group size p˜i (which in this example is 0.42). If the initial incumbent group size is below p˜i,
switching happens in the no-conflict regime. These observations hold quite generally. See Section 4 for
a discussion.24 3
4 Implications and Empirical Predictions
In this section, we highlight some important implications and empirical predictions of our framework.
4.1 Inefficiency in equilibrium
Both conflict and switching are socially inefficient. Conflict reduces surplus directly. Switching is costly,
but aggregate surplus is fixed. So, any outcome that involves conflict or switching is dominated by an
outcome with the same allocation but without conflict or switching. The only efficient equilibria are
those played on the economic path with no switching. Why do inefficient outcomes arise in equilibrium?
4.1.1 Inefficient conflict
One of the main contributions of this paper is to provide new insight into why we observe inefficient
conflict. The standard rational explanation for observing conflict appeals to asymmetric information and
limited commitment with the use of power (see Fearon (1995), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007), Powell
24We have also worked out examples with S–shaped success functions and find similar results.
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(2004)). In our model, while there is no asymmetric information, the lack of credible commitment with
respect to future transfers does restrict the allocation choices that can be implemented on the economic
path. However, our framework identifies a second new source of conflict: the inability of agents to
commit to not switch to the incumbent group once an allocation is offered. In particular, an allocation
that can Pareto improve upon the conflict outcome may require groups to retain their original sizes. But
the lack of commitment with respect to switching leaves the incumbent with fewer allocation choices
that are implementable. To see why, note that highest allocation that the incumbent can retain in the first
period while avoiding conflict is α. However, if the cost of mobility is not very high, then the allocation
α induces too much switching from the opposition, thus reducing the incumbent’s per capita share so
much that the expected payoff on the economic path is no longer worth avoiding conflict. Therefore,
there is an intermediate range (denoted hereafter by C) where the incumbent actually prefers to induce
conflict.25
To better understand how the lack of commitment with respect to switching gives rise to conflict, it
is useful to consider a hypothetical game where in the first period, the opposition can choose to commit
to not switching after observing the allocation. In this “new game,” first, nature chooses the incumbent,
then the opposition decides whether or not to commit, and then the original game is played.26
Consider the situation in this new game where the opposition does not commit not to switch. Clearly,
this subgame is the original game, and so if φ ∈ C , open conflict prevails, and the payoffs are
PA =
k
piA0
+ 1 + φ(1− piA0 )(2pc(piA0 )− 1) and PB = 1 + φpiA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 )).
Now, suppose the opposition commits to not switch after any allocation α is announced. Then, the
payoffs of the groups on the economic path are
ENSA (α) =
α
piA0
+1+φ(1−piA0 )(2pd(piA0 )−1) and ENSB (α) =
1− α
1− piA0
+1+φpiA0 (1−2pd(piA0 )).
Notice that group A’s (B’s) payoff is strictly increasing (decreasing) in α. For φ ∈ C , if the opposition
commits to not switch, the incumbent will offer α∗, where α∗ is the maximum share that it can retain
without inducing conflict (ENSB (α∗) = PB). A simple comparison of the expressions for ENSA , PA, ENSB
and PB then yields that the allocation α∗ Pareto strictly dominates the conflict outcome. In particular, at
allocation α∗, the opposition is at least as well off as under conflict, and the incumbent is strictly better
off. So in this new game where the opposition has the choice to commit to not switching, conflict does
not arise in equilibrium. Further, it is easy to check that α∗ > f(piA0 ). This implies that in the original
game with no commitment, α∗ would induce switching, thus reducing the incumbent’s per capita payoff
so much that it would not be optimal to propose α∗. We state this formally in the proposition below. The
details of the proof are in the appendix.
25Precisely, C = (φ1, φ2) ∪ {φ : k > φpiA0
`
1 + 2pd(pi
A
1 (α¯, pi
A
0 ))− 2pc(pi
A
0 )
´
and φ < φ4}.
26Here, we allow a commitment decision only in period 1. A similar result holds if we allow commitment in both periods.
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Proposition 3. Consider a new game where, in period 1, the opposition (B) has the option to commit
not to switch before the incumbent (A) offers the allocation. Open conflict cannot arise in equilibrium
in this game. Moreover, for the parameter range in which open conflict arise in the original game i.e.
φ ∈ C = (φ1, φ2) ∪ {φ : k > φpiA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A
1 (α¯, pi
A
0 ))− 2pc(piA0 )
)
and φ < φ4}, the equilibrium
in the new game Pareto dominates the open conflict equilibrium, and the equilibrium share α∗ is strictly
greater than f(piA0 ).
4.1.2 Inefficient switching across groups
Next, we ask why inefficient switching arises in equilibrium in the first period. Recall that the only
reason why an incumbent wants to induce opposition members to switch over is to increase its chances
of retaining power in the future. If there were no uncertainty about the future distribution of power, there
would be no motive to induce switching. This is also why we observe no switching in the second period.
It is worthwhile to point out that if agents were not myopic, then also, switching would not arise.
The intuition for this is as follows. If agents are non-myopic, any equilibrium allocation that causes
switching must leave the switchers and non-switchers in the opposition with the same expected two-
period payoff. Therefore, the difference in second period expected per capita payoffs between the two
groups must be exactly equal to the difference in the first period per capita payoffs plus the cost of
mobility. Put differently, there is no net benefit to inducing switching in equilibrium: any increase in
second period payoff due to increased political strength is exactly offset by an increase in the first-period
share that must be given to the non-switchers in the opposition. However, even if there is no actual
switching in equilibrium, the threat of switching still restricts the set of implementable allocations. In
the “no conflict” regime, the switching constraint binds. So, if there were some heterogeneity in φ
among agents, inefficient switching would again arise. This would be entirely driven by the uncertainty
regarding the future distribution of political power.27
4.2 Conflict may not arise at high cost of mobility
Our framework delivers some important insights about the relationship between conflict and inter-group
mobility. Low inter-group mobility is often claimed to be at the root of many of the social conflicts.
Fearon (2006) argues that low mobility across groups can provide an attractive basis for coalition forma-
tion. On similar lines, Caselli and Coleman (2006) show that conflict is relatively less likely to occur at
high inter-group mobility since it is anticipated that the winning coalition would expand. Their model
predicts that intense conflict is expected to arise in societies divided along characteristics that are rela-
tively difficult to change, such as ethnicity, race, color or religion. However empirical evidence suggests
that there isn’t such a simple causal relationship between mobility and conflict (see Collier and Hoef-
27A detailed analysis of the setting with non-myopic agents is available with the authors.
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fler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003)).28 There are examples where intense conflict arises between
groups where the cost of mobility is low (e.g. language-based discrimination), and others where cost
of mobility is very high, and yet conflict does not arise. Our model yields equilibrium predictions that
are consistent with these diverse examples. In particular, we show that open conflict may not arise even
when the cost of mobility is very high.
Proposition 4. Assume that A is the incumbent group in period 1 with size piA0 .
i) Suppose that conflict is sufficiently likely to reduce A’s probability of retaining power so that
pd
(
piA0
)− pc (piA0 ) > 1−piA02piA
0
. Then, there will be peaceful belligerence at φ = 1.
ii) Suppose that conflict is less likely to reduce A’s probability of retaining power so that pd
(
piA0
) −
pc
(
piA0
) ≤ 1−piA0
2piA
0
. Then, there will be open conflict at φ = 1 if and only if k is sufficiently high.
Details of the analysis are in the appendix. The intuition is by now familiar. When the cost of
mobility is maximal, both groups have strong incentives to gain power. But conflict entails two different
costs for the incumbent. It reduces the incumbent’s probability of retaining power, and can be wasteful in
the first period. When conflict significantly reduces the incumbent’s probability of retaining power, the
incumbent can avoid conflict only by sharing resources with the opposition. On the other hand, if conflict
does not reduce the incumbent’s probability of retaining power significantly, the incumbent induces open
conflict in equilibrium unless it is highly wasteful (low k).
As mentioned in the introduction, there are examples of societies divided along ethnicity or caste
(high cost of mobility), where there is no conflict, and indeed resource sharing occurs. For instance,
Padro´ i Miquel (2007) mentions Ivory Coast as an example, where the opposition is strong enough that
it needs to be bought off: Houphouet-Boigny’s regime in Ivory Coast was known to actually transfer
resources to the minority opposition ethnic groups. Another example would be India, where resources
are shared with backward castes through a range of reservation policies, which have helped mitigate
conflict. Such sharing in the shadow of conflict arises in equilibrium in our model.
The above proposition together with Proposition 2 show that there is no direct relationship between
conflict and mobility. It is possible for conflict to arise at intermediate costs of mobility even when it
may not arise at very high cost of mobility.
4.3 Destruction as a deterrent to conflict
The possibility of conflict disciplines the incumbent in our framework, by reducing its probability of
retaining power and by surplus destruction. Proposition 4 explores the role of the first effect and now,
we turn our attention to the second.
28Fearon and Laitin (2003) write “... it appears not to be true that a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity-or indeed
any particular cultural demography-by itself makes a country more prone to civil war. This finding runs contrary to a common
view among journalists, policy makers, and academics, which holds ”plural” societies to be especially conflict-prone due to
ethnic or religious tensions and antagonisms.”
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In general, open conflict increases as conflict becomes less wasteful (as k increases). A decrease in
k moves the conflict threshold of the incumbent, φ2, to the left. Thus conflict becomes less attractive to
the incumbent and possibility of open conflict decreases. For low cost of mobility, the no-conflict region
replaces a part of open conflict region, and for high cost of mobility, peaceful belligerence replaces open
conflict for some values of φ. Formally, we have the following result.
Proposition 5. Suppose for a given initial incumbent size piA0 , open conflict prevails if the cost of mobility
φ lies in the set φ ∈ C . This set C shrinks (monotonically decreases in the sense of set inclusion) as k
decreases. For k ≤ piA0 , C is an empty set.
The above result suggests that conflict is observed only when it is not very destructive. This is indeed
a feature of all models where agents have perfect information about the cost of conflict and the success
probability. To this extent, our model does not explain why we observe highly destructive conflict like
civil wars. Highly destructive conflict can arise in equilibrium if there were some incomplete information
about cost or success parameters.29
4.4 Peaceful belligerence does not arise with small incumbents
Another important prediction of our model is that if the incumbent group is a small minority of elites,
then sharing, if any, is driven by the switching constraint.
Proposition 6. If the incumbent group size is sufficiently small, then peaceful belligerence does not occur
in equilibrium regardless of the cost of mobility. Formally, there exists a threshold
¯
pi such that if the initial
group size is smaller than
¯
pi, then φ2 > 1. In particular, this threshold is increasing in k.
The proof of the result is in the appendix. If the initial group size is low enough, full expropriation
leads to a large pie being shared among a small number of individuals; raising the per capita payoff. In
such a situation, the incumbent will prefer full expropriation to the maximal payoff obtainable on the
economic path for any value of φ. Consequently, if the incumbent’s conflict threshold is above 1, the
peaceful belligerence regime does not arise in equilibrium.
Indeed, Proposition 2 and Proposition 6 together imply that peaceful belligerence occurs only for
high values of both pi and φ. In other words, in a society with high cost of mobility, if a majority group
assumes power, then it will share spoils with the minority to retain power and prevent conflict, but if the
minority is in power, then it will have an incentive to extract all surplus.
4.5 Non-monotonic equilibrium allocations
Our model implies that the equilibrium allocation is non-monotonic in the cost of mobility.
29See for example Wa¨rneryd (forthcoming), Collier and Hoeffler (2007), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) for discussion on
the role of information in conflict.
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Proposition 7. The equilibrium choice of allocation is increasing in the cost of mobility in the no conflict
regime, decreasing in the peaceful belligerence regime, and constant in the open conflict regime.
The result follows directly from Lemmata 4 and 5. The intuition is straightforward: In the no conflict
regime, the ruling group retains just enough surplus to induce optimal switching. So, as switching
becomes more costly, the incumbent can keep more for itself. In the open conflict regime, the incumbent
induces conflict by full expropriation. In the peaceful belligerence regime, the equilibrium allocation
is the maximum that the incumbent can keep without provoking conflict. An increase in the cost of
mobility raises the premium from winning political power, and thus enhances the opposition’s incentive
for conflict. The opposition has to be offered more to be prevented from engaging in conflict, and, hence
the equilibrium allocation is decreasing.
Together with Propositions 2 and 4, Proposition 7 implies that in societies with easy inter-group
mobility, we should expect equilibrium allocations to increase with the cost of mobility. Further, in
societies characterized by high cost of mobility, when the threat of conflict is strong, the equilibrium
allocation is decreasing in the cost of mobility. These results have testable implications, and a systematic
empirical analysis would be interesting.
4.6 Optimal group size and switching
Our model predicts that the ruling group’s equilibrium choice of allocation rule in the no conflict regime
is determined by its incentive to maintain an optimal group size.
Proposition 8. There exists a unique interior optimal group size for the ruling group. If the ruling
group’s initial size is below this optimal size, it induces switching from the opposition in the no conflict
regime. Otherwise, the incumbent does not induce switching in equilibrium.
The proof is straightforward and so we omit it here. The ruling group aspires to achieve an ideal size
pi where its increased political strength is balanced against the reduced share of per capita surplus. When
the ruling group’s size is below the optimal size, it prefers to induce switching to increase its political
strength. The only way it can induce switching is by retaining more resources for itself. However, such a
strategy also reduces opposition’s opportunity cost of conflict. In the no conflict regime, the ruling group
can retain enough resources so that the opposition prefers switching to conflict.
For tractability, we assumed that there are only two periods in the game, and that any group size
can be achieved in the current period by appropriate choice of allocation. A comprehensive analysis of
the multi-period game is beyond the scope of this paper. We, however, conjecture that in the dynamic
game, whenever there is no open conflict, the incumbent would increase its size unless already larger than
its optimal size. Moreover, as power alternates, group sizes would also swing in opposite directions.30
However, the size of each group would vary within an upper and a lower limit.
30Such swings can be often observed as a political party in power wins the support of some community with targeted policies.
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4.7 Ruling group’s preferred cost of mobility
In our framework, the cost of mobility is exogenous. We can ask what the incumbent’s preferred cost
of mobility would be, if he could choose it. Think of two groups who can be distinguished based on
more than one characteristic. For example, two ethnic groups living in the same area may develop
different professional skills or different religious practices. These different characteristics are associated
with different costs of mobility. The group in power can decide the specific characteristic along which
resources would be split. In such a setting, which social cleavage would the incumbent choose?31
Since the premium from power increases with the cost of mobility φ, we may expect that the in-
cumbent would choose a maximal cost of mobility. However, it turns out that if conflict is sufficiently
effective in changing the regime, then the incumbent may prefer an intermediate cost of mobility.
Proposition 9. Suppose A is the incumbent group in period 1 with size piA0 , and let VA (φ) denote A’s
expected two-period per capita payoff as a function of the cost of mobility φ.
i) If A’s success probability in conflict, pc
(
piA0
)
, is sufficiently high, VA always reaches its maximum
at φ = 1, the maximal cost of mobility.
ii) If A’s success probability in conflict, pc
(
piA0
)
, is not sufficiently high, there can be an interior cost
of mobility at which VA attains its maximum.
The proof of the proposition is in the appendix. The intuition is as follows. Two cases arise. First,
with low values of φ, the switching constraint binds, and the incumbent’s payoff is increasing in the cost
of mobility. Second, with high values of φ, either there is open conflict, or there is peaceful belligerence
(both determined by the conflict constraint). In this case (with high φ), the incumbent’s payoff depends
on its probability of retaining power in conflict. Notice that in the second period, the winner’s payoff
increases and the loser’s payoff decreases in the cost of mobility. If pc(pi0) is sufficiently low (high), the
incumbent is less (more) likely to be the winner in conflict, and its payoff is decreasing (increasing) in
φ. Hence, if pc(pi0) is sufficiently low, the incumbent may actually choose an interior cost of mobility.32
On the contrary, if pc(pi0) is sufficiently high, the incumbent’s payoff is increasing in all equilibrium
regimes, and it prefers a maximal φ.
Horowitz (1985) recounts how color provided a more advantageous form of differentiation than re-
ligion between the English and the African slaves in seventeenth century North-America (as conversion
to Christianity become more common).33 Such an extreme form of discrimination was possible and
remained in effect for a long time, as the English found little threat of losing power in conflict.
31The incumbent may also be able to take measures to change the cost of mobility between the groups. We can ask what its
preferred level of mobility would be.
32It is important to note that at an interior maximal cost of mobility, we may observe peaceful belligerence (if φ4 < 1) or no
conflict (if φ2 < 1 < φ3) in equilibrium.
33Horowitz (1985, p 43) states that “. . . the English were originally called ‘Christians,’ while the African slaves were de-
scribed as ‘heathens.’ The initial differentiation of groups relied heavily on religion. After about 1680, however, a new
dichotomy of ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ supplanted the former Christian and heathen categories, for some slaves had become Chris-
tians. If reliance had continued to be placed mainly on religion, baptism could have been employed to escape from bondage.”
24
The example below illustrates the result of Proposition 9 by plotting the incumbent’s expected ag-
gregate payoff as a function of the cost of mobility, for specific parameter values.
Example 2. We revisit Example 1. We assume that A is the incumbent in period 1. Consider the
following parameter specifications: piA0 = 0.4, k = 0.9, d = 3. Figure 3 plots A’s expected two-
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Figure 3: Incumbent’s expected total payoff against cost of mobility
period payoff as a function of the cost of mobility φ. The left panel corresponds to a case with low
success probability during conflict (c = 0.5) and the right panel corresponds to a case with high success
probability during conflict (c = 2.8). In the first case, A’s payoff is decreasing in the open conflict regime
and therefore we have an interior maximum at the opposition conflict threshold φ1, which is 0.46 . In the
second case, payoff is increasing in the open conflict regime and maximized at φ = 1. 3
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study group-based politics in divided societies, and our central objective is to develop
a coherent model that explains the salience of inter-group differences in conflict. We present a model of
political competition between two groups, where political power implies the right to allocate society’s
resources and allows the possibility of engaging in economic exclusion based on group identities. We
model group membership to be endogenous: Individuals can switch groups by incurring a cost, where
this cost of mobility captures the extent of inter-group differences.
The main substance of the analysis is in showing that the extent of inter-group differences and the
group sizes are the two factors that together determine the level of economic exclusion, and how these
factors, in turn, determine the emergence of inter-group conflict. We characterize how resources are
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shared in equilibrium and when conflict arises. We provide a new explanation for why inefficient conflict
is observed in equilibrium. We also derive several predictions that are consistent with stylized facts, and
have not been shown earlier. For instance, we can explain why open conflict does not necessarily arise
when the cost of mobility is high. In particular, we can show that in equilibrium, a majority ethnic group
may choose to transfer resources to the opposition to avoid conflict. We also show that open conflict can
occur at an intermediate cost of mobility.
However, many interesting questions remain unanswered. A simplifying assumption is that all mem-
bers in a group are treated homogeneously. In many contexts, it is more realistic to allow some within-
group hierarchy: for instance, new members and original members may be treated differently. Allowing
a richer action space that allows heterogeneous treatment may lead to new insights. Another assump-
tion made for tractability is that the game lasts for two periods. While we conjecture that many of the
qualitative insights will carry over to an infinite horizon model, a fully dynamic model will allow us to
analyze how group sizes evolve over time, and the dynamics of regime changes. Finally, a promising line
of investigation is related to the broader question of what is the basis for group formation in politics. For
instance, when do groups form along ethnic lines (with high cost of mobility) and when do they form
along ideological lines (relatively low cost)? Is there a theory that explains widespread politicization of
ethnic or religious identities? We leave these questions for future research.
26
References
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.: 2000, Why did the west extend the franchise?, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 115(November), 1167–1199.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.: 2001a, Inefficient redistribution, American Political Science Review
95, 649–661.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.: 2001b, A theory of political transitions, American Economic Review
91, 938–963.
Alesina, A., Baqir, R. and Easterly, W.: 1999, Public goods and ethnic divisions, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 114(4), 1243–1284.
Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E.: 2005, Ethnic diversity and economic performance, Journal of Economic
Literature 63(September), 762–800.
Azam, J.-P.: 1995, How to pay for the peace?, Public Choice 83(April), 173–184.
Azam, J.-P.: 2001, The redistributive state and conflicts in africa, Journal of Peace Research 38(4), 429–
444.
Bates, R. H.: 1983, Modernization, ethnic competition, and the rationality of politics in contemporary
africa, in D. Rothchild and V. A. Olunsorola (eds), State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilem-
mas, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Caselli, F. and Coleman, W. J.: 2006, On the theory of ethnic conflict, NBER Working Paper No. 12125.
Chandra, K.: 2004, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed, Cambridge University Press.
Collier, P.: 2001, Ethnic diversity: An economic analysis of its implications, Economic Policy, 32, 129–
166.
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A.: 2004, Greed and grievance in civil war, Oxford Economics Papers
56(4), 563–595.
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A.: 2007, Civil war, in T. Sandler and K. Hartley (eds), Handbook of Defense
Economics, Elsevier.
Esteban, J., Mayoral, L. and Ray, D.: 2011, Ethnicity and conflict: An empirical study, p. working paper.
Esteban, J. and Ray, D.: 1994, On the measurement of polarization, Econometrica 62, 819–852.
Esteban, J. and Ray, D.: 1999, Conflict and distribution, Journal of Economic Theory 87, 379–415.
27
Esteban, J. and Ray, D.: 2008, On the salience of ethnic conflict, American Economic Review
98(5), 2185–2202.
Esteban, J. and Ray, D.: 2011, Linking conflict to inequality and polarization, American Economic
Review p. forthcoming.
Esteban, Joan, C. G. and Ray, D.: 2007, An extension of a measure of polarization, with an application
to the income distribution of five oecd countries., Journal of Economic Inequality 5(1), 1–19.
Fearon, J.: 1998, Commitment problems and the spread of ethnic conflict, in D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild
(eds), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fearon, J. D.: 1995, Rationalist explanations for war, International Organization 49(3), 379–414.
Fearon, J. D.: 1999, Why ethnics politics and ’pork’ tend to go together, Mimeo, Stanford University.
Fearon, J. D.: 2006, Ethnic mobilization and ethnic violence, in B. R. Weingast and D. Wittman (eds),
Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford University Press.
Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D.: 1996, Explaining interethnic cooperation, American Political Science
Review 90(December), 715–735.
Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D.: 2003, Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war, American Political Science
Review 97(1), 75–90.
Foster, J. and Wolfson, M. C.: 1992, Polarization and the decline of the middle class: Canada and the
us., pp. Venderbilt University, mimeo.
Fryer, R. D.: 2007, A model of social interactions and endogenous poverty traps, Rationality and Society
19(3), 335–366.
Fryer, R. D. and Torelli, P.: 2010, An empirical analysis of ‘acting white’, Journal of Public Economics
94, 380–396.
Garfinkel, M. and Skaperdas, S.: 2007, Economics of conflict: An overview, in T. Sandler and K. Hartley
(eds), Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
Grossman, H. I.: 1991, A general equilibrium model of insurrections, American Economic Review
81(4), 912–921.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L.: 2009, Cultural bias in economic exchange, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 124(3), 1095–1131.
Gurr, T. R. and Harff, B.: 1994, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Westview Press.
28
Hirschman, A. O.: 1964, The paternity of an index, American Economic Review 54(5), 761–762.
Hirschman, A. O.: 1970, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hirshleifer, J.: 1995, Anarchy and its breakdown, Journal of Political Economy 103(February), 26–52.
Horowitz, D.: 1985, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press.
Horowitz, D.: 2001, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Laitin, D. D.: 2007, Nations States and Violence, Oxford University Press.
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. and Sergenti, E.: 2004, Economic shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental
variables approach, Journal of Political Economy 112(4), 725–753.
Padro´ i Miquel, G.: 2007, The control of politicians in divided societies: The politics of fear, Review of
Economic Studies 74, 1259–1274.
Posner, D. N.: 2004, The political salience of cultural difference: Why chewas and tumbukas are allies
in zambia and adversaries in malawi, American Political Science Review 98(4), 529–545.
Powell, R.: 2004, The inefficient use of power: Costly conflict with complete information, American
Political Science Review 98(2), 231–241.
Reynal-Querol, M.: 2002, Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars, Journal of Conflict Resolution
46(1), 29–54.
Rodrı´guez, J. G. and Salas, R.: 2002, Extended bi-polarization and inequality measures, Research on
Economic Inequality 9, 69–84.
Spolaore, E. and Wacziarg, R.: 2009, The diffusion of development, Quarterly Journal of Economics
124(2), 469–530.
Wa¨rneryd, K.: forthcoming, Informational aspects of conflict, in M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas (eds),
Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, Oxford University Press.
Wolfson, M. C.: 1994, When inequalities diverge, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings
84(2), 353–358.
29
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For αW2 < g(piW1 ), the per capita payoff is given by α
W
2
piW
2
= 1 − φ[1 − piW2 (αW2 )], which is
increasing in piW2 (αW2 ), and consequently in αW2 . In the range αW2 ∈ [g(piW1 ), f(piW1 )], α
W
2
piW
2
(αW
2
)
=
αW
2
piW
1
,
which increases linearly in αW2 . For αW2 > f(piW1 ), the per capita payoff is
αW
2
piW
2
= 1+ φ[1− piW2 (αW2 )]
which is decreasing in piW2 (αW2 ), and therefore in αW2 . It follows that the per capita share of surplus
αW
2
piW
2
(αW
2
)
for group W has a unique maximum which occurs at αW2 = f(piW1 ).
6.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. We first show show that EA
(
αA1 , pi
A
1 (α
A
1 )
)
=
αA
1
piA
1
+ 1 + φ(1 − piA1 )(2pd(piA1 ) − 1) is single-
peaked. Consider EA
(
αA1 , pi
A
1 (α
A
1 )
)
in the range
{
α : α ≤ g (piA0 )}. By Lemma 3, when αA1 < g(piA0 ),
this induces switching from A to B and the new size of A is piA1 = g−1(αA1 ). Substituting, we have,
EA
(
αA1 , pi
A
1 (α
A
1 )
)
= 2− 2φ(1 − piA1 )
(
1− pd
(
piA1
))
,
which is increasing in piA1 . We know g is increasing, and so piA1 = g−1(αA1 ) is increasing in αA1 . It
follows that EA
(
αA1 , pi
A
1 (α
A
1 )
)
is increasing in αA1 .
Now, for αA1 ∈ [g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )], we know that no switching occurs and piA1 (αA1 ) = piA0 . Therefore
EA(α
A
1 , pi
A
1 (α
A
1 )) is increasing in α in this range.
Finally, we show thatEA first increases and then decreases in αA1 over the range
{
αA1 : α
A
1 ≥ f1
(
piA0
)}
.
Consider αA1 > f1(piA0 ). We know, again from Lemma 3, that this would induce switching from group
B to A and the new size of group A would be piA1 = f−1(αA1 ). So we have,
EA
(
αA1 , pi
A
1 (α
A
1 )
)
= 2 + 2φpd(pi
A
1 )(1 − piA1 ),
which decreases in piA1 above p˜i, and so decreasing in αA1 above max
{
f(piA0 ), f (p˜i)
}
in the range{
αA1 : α
A
1 > f1(pi
A
0 )
}
. Define max
{
piA0 , p˜i
}
= piA0 . It follows immediately, that the function EA is
single peaked and maximized at αA1 = f
(
piA0
)
.
Next, consider EB
(
αA1 , pi
A
1 (α
A
1 )
)
=
1−αA
1
1−piA
1
+ 1+ φpiA1 (1− 2pd(piA1 )). Since pd(pi)(1− pi) is single-
peaked, this implies that pi(pd(1 − pi)) is single-peaked. Let ˜˜pi denote the value at which the maximum
is attained. Consider the range where αA1 < g(piA0 ). In this case, switching leads to piA1 = g−1(αA1 ).
Substituting for αA1 = g(piA1 ), we find EB
(
αA1 , pi
A
1 (pi
A
0 )
)
= 1+1+ 2φpiA1 (1− pd(piA1 )) which increases
in piA1 up to ˜˜pi, and so increasing in αA1 up to min
{
g(piA0 ), g
(
˜˜pi
)}
in the range
{
αA1 : α
A
1 < g(pi
A
0 )
}
. Now
consider αA1 ∈ [g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )]. In this range, no switching occurs (piA0 = piA1 ). So, EB is decreasing
in αA1 . Finally, when αA1 > f(piA0 ), switching occurs along the economic path, and piA1 = f−1(αA1 ).
Substituting for αA1 = f(piA1 ), we find EB
(
αA1 , pi
A
1 (pi
A
0 )
)
= 1 + 1 − 2φpiA1 pd(piA1 )) which decreases
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in piA1 and therefore also in αA1 . Thus, EB
(
αA1 , pi
A
1 (α
A
1 )
)
is also single-peaked in αA1 with the peak
occurring at αA1 = min
{
g(piA0 ), g
(
˜˜pi
)}
.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We start by comparing the function EB
(
αA1 , pi
A
1 (α
A
1 )
)
with PB . We have
EB
(
αA1 , pi
A
1 (α
A
1 )
)
=

2 + 2φpiA1 (1− pd(piA1 )) if αA1 < g(piA0 )
1−αA
1
1−piA
0
+ 1 + φpiA0 (1− 2pd(piA0 )) if αA1 ∈ [g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )]
2− 2φpiA1 pd(piA1 )) if αA1 > f(piA0 )
PB = 1 + φpi
A
0 (1− 2pc(piA0 ))
If αA1 = 0, switching would occur fromA toB and piA1 = g−1(0) = 0. Consequently, EB(0, piA1 (0, piA0 )) =
1 + 1. At αA1 = 0, EB = 2 > PB . Moreover, Lemma 4 shows that the function EB first increases and
then decreases. This implies that either PB intersects EB at exactly one point (which is given by α) or
EB lies entirely above PB , in which case α = 1.
First consider the case where α is given by the intersection between PB and EB . We know that there
cannot be two such intersections. Note now that at α = g(piA0 ), EB > 2 > PB . Therefore, α > g(piA0 ).
If α ∈ (g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )), then α is given by
1− α
1− piA0
+ 1 + φpiA0 (1− 2pd(piA0 )) = 1 + φpiA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 ))
α = 1− 2φpiA0 (1− piA0 )[pd(piA0 )− pc(piA0 )]
which is decreasing in φ since piA0 ∈ (0, 1) and pd(piA0 ) ≥ pc(piA0 ). On the other hand, if α > f(piA0 ),
then α is given implicitly by the group composition pi that satisfies
2− 2φpiA1 pd(piA1 )) = 1 + φpiA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 ))
pi1pd(pi1) =
1
2
[
1
φ
− piA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 ))
]
Since the LHS is strictly increasing in pi1 and the RHS is constant, there is a unique solution to the
equation. Also, since piA1 (α) is increasing in the range α > f(piA0 ), there is a unique α that corresponds
to pi. Notice that pi and hence α is decreasing in φ. Therefore, whenever α < 1, it is decreasing in φ.
At αA1 = 1, piA1 = f−1(1) = 1. Therefore, EB = 1 + 1 − 2φpd(1). By comparing PB with EB at
αA1 = 1, it is easy to see that EB ≥ PB for all αA1 with strict equality only at αA1 = 1 if and only if
φ ≤ 1
2pd(1) + pi
A
0 (1− 2pc(piA0 ))
:= φ1.
Since pd(·) is increasing and a probability, pd(1) > piA0 . This implies that φ > 0.
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6.4 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. We compare EA
(
αe1, pi
A
1 (α
e
1)
)
with PA. Notice that αe1 = f(piA) = piA + φpiA(1 − piA) from
Lemma 4. Therefore, at the allocation αe1, EA is given by EA
(
αe1, pi
A
1 (α
e
1)
)
= 2 + 2φpd(pi
A)(1 − piA).
So, EA is greater than PA if and only if 2 + 2φpd(piA)(1− piA) ≥ kpiA
0
+ 1 + φ(1 − piA0 )(2pc(piA0 )− 1).
Simplifying we get
φ ≥

(
k−piA
0
1−piA
0
)
piA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A)1−pi
A
1−piA
0
− 2pc(piA0 )
)
 := φ2
6.5 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. From Lemma 4, αe = f1(piA0 ). Hence, we have
αe ∈ E ⇐⇒ EB(αe, piA1 (αe, piA0 )) ≥ PB
⇐⇒ φ ≤ 1
piA0 (1 + 2pd(pi
A
0 )
piA
0
piA
0
− 2pc(piA0 ))
:= φ3
Since the denominator piA0 (1 + 2pd(piA0 )
piA
0
piA
0
− 2pc(piA0 )) > piA0 (1 + 2pd(piA0 ) − 2pc(piA0 )) > piA0 (1 +
2pd(pi
A
0 ) − 2pd(piA0 )) > 0, we must have φ3 > 0. Now, if φ > φ3, clearly, αe /∈ E. From Lemma 5,
αe > α. Also, since EA(α, piA1 (α, piA0 )) is single peaked in α with the peak occuring at αe, we must have
EA(α, pi
A
1 (α, pi
A
0 )) strictly increasing in α in the range [0, α].
6.6 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. First, we establish that φ4 ≥ max{φ2, φ3}. To see that, notice
φ2 <
1
piA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A)1−pi
A
1−piA
0
− 2pc(piA0 )
) ≤ 1
piA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A
0 )
1−piA
0
1−piA
0
− 2pc(piA0 )
) = φ4
and
φ3 =
1
piA0 (1 + 2pd(pi
A
0 )
piA
0
piA
0
− 2pc(piA0 ))
≤ 1
piA0 (1 + 2pd(pi
A
0 )
piA
0
piA
0
− 2pc(piA0 ))
= φ4
Now, if φ ≥ φ4, we must have φ ≥ max{φ2, φ3}. Thus, the incumbent has to choose between α and
αP . Now, when α ∈ (g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )), then α is given by α = 1 − 2φpiA0 (1 − piA0 )[pd(piA0 ) − pc(piA0 )].
Substituting for f(piA0 ), for α,we have piA0 +φpiA0 (1−piA0 ) = 1−2φpiA0 (1−piA0 )[pd(piA0 )−pc(piA0 )], or φ =
φ4. Since α is continuous and strictly decreasing in φ, α < f(piA0 ) for φ ≥ φ4. Therefore, piA1 (α, piA0 ) =
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piA0 for φ ≥ φ4. Now, EA(α, piA1 (α, piA0 ))− PA is equal to
αA1 − k
piA0
+ φ(1 − piA0 )(2pd(piA0 )− 2pc(piA0 )) =
1− k
piA0
> 0
since αA1 = 1− 2φpiA0 (1− piA0 )[pd(piA0 )− pc(piA0 )]
6.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First, by Lemma 5, if φ is below φ1, the opposition will accept any allocation, and therefore
in this range, the incumbent is forced to choose αe. The choice of the incumbent matters only when
φ > φ1.Now, as Lemma 6 shows, when φ ≤ φ2, the incumbent actually prefers conflict to any allocation
implementable along the economic path. If we have φ ∈ [φ1, φ2), the incumbent then induces conflict
by offering αP = 1. When φ > max {φ1, φ2} , then the incumbent prefers economic activity if αe, is
accepted. By Lemma 7, αe is accepted if and only if φ < φ3. Therefore, the incumbent offers αe and
induces economic activity if φ ∈ (max {φ1, φ2} , φ3]. For φ > φ3, the incumbent must make a larger
offer α¯ to induce the economic path. For φ > max {φ2, φ3} , the incumbent has to choose between α¯ and
αP . If piA = piA0 , then it is easy to check that φ4 = φ3, and then, by Lemma 4, for φ > φ4, the incumbent
offers α¯, which is just enough to prevent the opposition from launching conflict. On the other hand, if
piA < piA0 , then we have another range (max {φ2, φ3} , φ4) where the choice between open conflict and
peaceful belligerence depends on the cost and benefit of conflict.
Suppose φ ∈ (max {φ2, φ3} , φ4). Since φ > max {φ2, φ3} , the optimal choice is either α¯ or αp,
depending on the sign of EA(α, piA1 (α, piA0 )) − PA. From Lemma 5, α is continuous and strictly de-
creasing in φ. From the proof of Lemma 8, we know that when φ = φ4, α = f(piA0 ). Therefore, for
φ < φ4, α > f(pi
A
0 ). Moreover, when α > f(piA0 ), we know that there is switching, and the conse-
quent group size piA1 (α, piA0 ) is strictly increasing in α, and therefore strictly decreasing in φ. Now we
express EA(α, piA1 (α, piA0 )) − PA as Z(φ), and examine its sign as a function of φ. Just for notational
convenience, we write piA1 (α, piA0 ) simply as pi(φ)
Z(φ) = EA(α, pi
A
1 (α, pi
A
0 ))− PA
= − k
pi0
+ φ(1− 2pc(pi0)) + 2φpd(pi(φ)).
It is easy to see that Z(φ) ≥ 0 if and only if k ≤ φpiA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A
1 (α¯, pi
A
0 ))− 2pc(piA0 )
)
. Open conflict
prevails otherwise. When k = 0, Z(φ) = φ(1 − 2pc(pi0)) + 2φpd(pi(φ)) > 0. We now show that
Z(φ) < 0 when k = 1. Z(φ) at k = 1 is
− 1
pi
+ φ[1 + 2pd(pi)− 2pc(pi)]
=
(
pi − pi
pi
)(
φ[1− 2pc(pi)]− 1
pi
)
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Since pi − pi > 0, if 1 − 2pc(pi) < 0, then Z(φ) is negative. Now suppose 1 − 2pc(pi) > 0. We have
φ < φ4, implying φ < 1pi[1−2pc(pi)+2pd(pi)]
1
pi[1−2pc(pi)]
. This simplifies to φ[1 − 2pc(pi)] < 1pi . Again,(
bpi−pi
bpi
) (
φ[1− 2pc(pi)]− 1pi
)
< 0. Therefore, Z(φ) at k = 1 is negative.
6.8 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider the subgame where the opposition does not commit not to switch. Clearly, this subgame
is precisely the “original game”. So, for φ ∈ C , conflict prevails in equilibrium, and payoffs are
PA =
k
piA0
+ 1 + φ(1− piA0 )(2pc(piA0 )− 1) and PB = 1 + φpiA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 )).
Now, consider the subgame where the opposition commits not to switch. The payoffs to each group on
the economic path in this subgame are given by
ENSA (α) =
α
piA0
+1+φ(1−piA0 )(2pd(piA0 )−1) and ENSB (α) =
1− α
1− piA0
+1+φpiA0 (1−2pd(piA0 )).
We show that in equilibrium, the incumbent will offer α∗, where α∗ is defined as by ENSB (α∗) = PB .
• First, note that α∗ exists as long as φ ∈ (φ1, φ2). From the definition of α∗, we have
α∗ = 1− 2φpiA0 (1− piA0 )(pd(piA0 )− pc(piA0 ))
Since pd(piA0 ) > pc(piA0 ), α∗ < 1. For α∗ > 0, we need φ < 12piA
0
(1−piA
0
)(pd(pi
A
0
)−pc(piA0 ))
:= φ.
Now,
1
φ4
− 1
φ
= piA0 + 2
(
piA0
)2
(pd(pi
A
0 )− pc(piA0 )) > 0⇒ φ > φ4
Since φ2 < φ4, we must have φ < φ. Therefore, α∗ ∈ (0, 1)
• Any α > α∗ will be rejected, and will result in payoffs {PA, PB}. We show that ENSA (α∗) > PA.
ENSA (α
∗)−PA = 1− k
piA0
−2φ(1−piA0 )(pd(piA0 )−pc(piA0 ))+2φ(1−piA0 )(pd(piA0 )−pc(piA0 )) =
1− k
piA0
> 0
Therefore, the incumbent prefers offering α∗ (and inducing the economic path) to conflict. More-
over, α∗ is the maximal share implementable on the economic path.
• Since φ ∈ C , if the opposition does not commit, it earns a payoff of PB . On committing not to
switch groups, it earns the same amount. We assumed that the the economic path is chosen when
the opposition is indifferent. So, the opposition commits not to switch in equilibrium.
• Finally, note that α∗ − f(piA0 ) = (1− piA0 )[1− φpiA0 {2(pd(piA0 )− pc(piA0 )) + 1}] > 0
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6.9 Proof of Proposition 4
Before we prove Proposition 4, we establish the following lemma:
Lemma 9. φ3 ≤ max
k
φ2 ≤ φ4. The relationship holds with strict inequalities if piA0 < p˜i and with
equality otherwise.
Proof. We omit the proof, as it follows directly from the definitions of p¯i and p˜i and by inspection of the
expressions for φ1, φ3 and φ4.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. The first part of the proposition derives the condition φ4 to be strictly less than 1. To see this,
φ4 < 1⇔ 1
piA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A
0 )− 2pc(piA0 )
) < 1
⇔ (pd(piA0 )− 2pc(piA0 )) > 12
(
1
piA0
− 1
)
=
1− piA0
2piA0
.
If φ4 < 1, by Proposition 2, there will be peaceful belligerence at φ = 1.
On the other hand, if φ4 ≥ 1, by Lemma 9, we see that maxk φ2 can also be greater or equal to 1.
We split this in two subcases: (i) maxk φ2 ≥ 1 and (ii) maxk φ2 < 1.
In subcase (i), as φ2 is linearly increasing in k ∈ [0, 1], there exists a threshold k1, such that φ2 ≥ 1
if and only if k ≥ k1. As φ1 is always less than 1, we then have 1 ∈ (φ1, φ2]. Therefore, by Proposition
2, there is open conflict at φ = 1 if and only if k ≥ k1.
In subcase (ii), we have maxk φ2 < 1 but φ4 ≥ 1. By Lemma 9, we see that 1 ∈ (max {φ2, φ3} , φ4).
By Proposition 2, it implies that open conflict occurs at φ = 1 if k is above a certain threshold (denote
the threshold by k2), which is derived in the proof of Proposition 2).
Together, we see that in both cases, open conflict occurs at φ = 1, if k is sufficiently high.
6.10 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Assume that k > piA0 . It is easy to see that a sufficient condition for φ−12 < 1 is
2pd(pi
A)
1− piA
1− piA0
− 2pc(piA0 ) <
k
piA0
+ piA0 − 2
Notice that 2pd(piA)(1 − piA) has a maximum value of 2, and kpiA
0
+ piA0 − 2 increases unboundedly as
piA0 goes down since k > piA0 >
(
piA0
)2
. So, for pi0 <
¯
pi where k
piA
0
+ piA0 − 2 = 2, i.e. ¯pi = 2 −
√
4− k.
Notice that
¯
pi < k since k < 1.
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6.11 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. For any φ ≤ max{φ2, φ3}, φ ∈ C if and only if φ ∈ (φ1, φ2). And for φ > max{φ2, φ3}, φ ∈ C
if and only if k > φpiA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A
1 (α¯, pi
A
0 ))− 2pc(piA0 )
)
and φ < φ4. Therefore, we can define
C = (φ1, φ2) ∪ {φ : k > φpiA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A
1 (α¯, pi
A
0 ))− 2pc(piA0 )
)
and φ < φ4}
Now, as k increases, φ2 increases, leading to an expansion in (φ1, φ2). Also, with an increase in k, the set
{φ : k > φpiA0
(
1 + 2pd(pi
A
1 (α¯, pi
A
0 ))− 2pc(piA0 )
)} and therefore {φ : k > φpiA0 (1 + 2pd(piA1 (α¯, piA0 ))− 2pc(piA0 ))}∩
(φ4, 1] expands. Therefore, C expands with k.
6.12 Proof of Proposition 9
To prove this result, we need the following lemma, which describes how the incumbent’s expected two-
period per capita payoff varies with the cost of mobility in the three different equilibrium regimes.
Lemma 10. Suppose A is the incumbent group in period 1 with size piA0 , and let VA (φ) denote A’s
expected two-period per capita payoff as a function of the cost of mobility φ. In the no conflict equilibrium
regime, VA is increasing in φ. In the open conflict regime and in the peaceful belligerence regime with
no switching, VA is increasing in φ if and only if pc
(
piA0
) ≥ 12 . In the peaceful belligerence regime with
switching, a sufficient condition for VA to be increasing in φ is that pc
(
piA0
) ≥ 12 .
Proof. VA (φ) denotes A’s expected two-period per capita payoff as a function of φ.
VA (φ) =

EA(α
e
1, pi
A
1 (α
e
1))
PA
EA(α, pi
A
1 (α, pi
A
0 ))
in the no conflict regime
in the open conflict regime
in the peaceful belligerence regime
.
It is easy to see that EA
(
αe1, pi
A
1 (α
e
1)
)
is strictly increasing in the cost of mobility φ and PA is strictly
increasing in φ if and only if pc(piA0 ) > 12 .
The relationship between the incumbent’s payoff in the peaceful belligerence regime and the cost of
mobility depends on whether or not switching occurs in equilibrium. First consider the peaceful belliger-
ence without switching. Such a case arises if α ∈ [g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )]. In this case, EA(α, piA1 (α, piA0 )) =
1
piA
0
+ 1 + φ(1− piA0 )
(
2pc(pi
A
0 )− 1
)
, which is increasing in φ if and only if pc(piA0 ) > 12 .
Next consider the peaceful belligerence regime with switching. Such a case arises if α > f(piA0 ).
In this case, α satisfies EB
(
α, piA1 (α)
)
= PB . As derived in the proof of Lemma 5, we see that α is given
implicitly by the group composition pi (= piA1 (α, piA0 )) that satisfies pi1pd(pi1) = 12
[
1
φ
− piA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 ))
]
,
and pi is decreasing in φ. In this case, we have piEA(α, piA1 (α, piA0 )) + (1− pi)EB(α, piA1 (α, piA0 )) = 2.
Therefore, substituting for EB(·) we get
EA(α, pi
A
1 (α, pi
A
0 )) = 1 +
1
pi
+
(
1
pi
− 1
)
φpiA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 )) (2)
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As pi is decreasing in φ, and if pc(piA0 ) > 12 , all the terms in (2) are positive and increasing in the cost of
mobility φ. Therefore a sufficient condition for EA(α, piA1 (α, piA0 )) (in the peaceful belligerence regime
with switching) to be increasing in φ is that pc(piA0 ) > 12 .
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. We can rewrite VA(φ) as follows:
VA(φ) = max{E′A(φ), P ′A(φ)}
where E′A(φ) =
{
EA(α
e, piA1 (α
e)) for φ ∈ [0, φ3]
EA(α, pi
A
1 (α)) for φ ∈ (φ3, 1]
and P ′A(φ) =
{
0 for φ ∈ [0, φ1]
PA for φ ∈ (φ1, 1]
For the first part of the proposition, we show that if pc(piA0 ) > 12 , VA(φ) is maximized at φ = 1. As
EA(α
e, piA1 (α
e)) = EA(α¯, pi
A
1 (α¯)) at φ = φ3, it follows that E′A(φ) is continuous in φ ∈ [0, 1]. More-
over, by Lemma 10, if pc(piA0 ) > 12 , EA(α
e, piA1 (α
e)) is strictly increasing in φ ∈ [0, φ3], EA(α¯, piA1 (α¯))
is strictly increasing in φ ∈ (φ3, 1] and PA is strictly increasing in φ. Therefore, if pc(piA0 ) > 12 , the func-
tion E′A(φ) is strictly increasing in φ ∈ [0, 1], and the function P ′A(φ), by construction, is constant over
[0, φ1] and strictly increasing over (φ1, 1]. Now notice that if there are real valued functions f and g that
are strictly (weakly) increasing over the same range, then the function max {f, g} will also be strictly
(weakly) increasing over the same range. This indicates that VA(φ) is weakly increasing over [0, φ1] and
strictly increasing over (φ1, 1]. Moreover, since VA(φ) = max{EA(αe, piA1 (αe)), 0} = EA(αe, piA1 (αe))
for ∈ [0, φ1], VA(φ) is strictly increasing over [0, φ1]. Therefore, VA(φ) is strictly increasing (possibly
discontinuously) over the entire range of φ.
To prove the second part of the proposition, we show that there may exist local maxima in (0, 1) if
pc(pi
A
0 ) <
1
2 . By Lemma 10, VA (φ) is strictly decreasing over (φ1, φ2]. As VA (φ) is increasing up to
φ = φ1, we may have a local maximum at φ1. A sufficient condition for this local maximum to be a
global maximum is that φ2 ≥ 1. Similar, one can derive other sufficient conditions for φ = 1 not to be a
global maximum. For example, if φ4 < 1, by Proposition 2, we know that peaceful belligerence regime
without switching prevails in (φ4, 1]. Further, as pc(piA0 ) < 12 , by Lemma 10, VA (φ) is decreasing in
(φ4, 1]. Therefore, φ = 1 cannot even be a local maximum in this case.
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